Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, thank you

very much for the invitation to be here today and to testify. I will

try to be very brief in summarizing my statement.

While one can argue and I think somewhat legitimately that U.S.

policies have succeeded in slowing the North’s progress and in galvanizing

international support, the successes that we have reached,

that we have achieved are at best tactical. As President John

Adams once said, the facts are stubborn things. And today North

Korea has declared itself to be a nuclear power and seems absolutely

determined and well on its way to acquire the means to hold

American cities hostage to their long-range missiles and nuclear

weapons.

Viewing policy from a nonproliferation perspective, I see a long

pattern of failed policies that must be changed. This change should

be based on experience, not on hope, and it is on this basis that

I offer the following lessons learned from my own experience.

One, North Korea will only agree to abandon its missile and

nuclear programs if it is judged essential for regime survival. The

DPRK places the highest values on these capabilities. These are a

deterrent against attack. These are a means of preventing intervention

such as occurred in Libya. Missile and nuclear programs

are important to intimidate neighbors, to build prestige at home,

to earn hard currency. In addition, the North has successfully used

its nuclear program to attract inducements from those who seek its

elimination.

Two, the prospect for a negotiated solution should be seen as a

long shot. At times, previous administrations have thought they

were all but there, but it never happened whether it was in 1992,

in 1994, or in 2005. Pyongyang would formally agree to abandon

its nuclear program only to violate its commitments each time. And

this pattern of failed negotiations, followed by violations of obligations,

provocations, and the offering of more inducements in turn

by the United States and others to get North Korea back to the

negotiating table, has been the main characteristic of U.S. policy

for two decades.

The United States and others have and will, no doubt, continue

to apply sanctions on the North, but imposing economic hardships

and threatening isolation have not altered the regime’s behavior. In

part, this is because the DPRK cares little whether its people

starve. In part, it is because regime stability is, in fact, dependent

on isolation. In part, it is because China has continued to keep

open a lifeline of assistance to the North no matter how blatant or

how lethal its activities. And in part, it is because of our own practice

of releasing pressure on North Korea in exchange for empty

promises.

Three, the record of failed negotiations is not an argument that

diplomacy should be abandoned. But negotiations by themselves is

not a strategy. A comprehensive approach that integrates all tools

of statecraft is required if negotiations are to have any chance of

success. These tools, financial, intelligence, interdiction, law enforcement,

and diplomacy—and we have talked about them all this

morning—must be brought together to bring sustained pressure on

the regime. Pyongyang must be faced with a choice: it can retain

its missile and nuclear programs or it pays a high price. It must

no longer be allowed to use these programs as a means to extract

concessions that only serve to strengthen the regime and perpetuate

the missile and nuclear threat. As for diplomacy, our main

focus should be on China, the principal obstacle to bringing effective

pressure on North Korea.

Four, the promotion of human rights, while part of official U.S.

talking points for years, has not been a significant element of U.S.

strategy. It should be as it was in the Reagan administration in its

dealings with the Soviet Union. Exposing the domestic brutality of

the regime is both the moral course and potentially an effective

means to influence DPRK leaders.

Five, because North Korea is likely to retain its missile and

nuclear capabilities, the United States must ensure that it can

deter and defend against the threat. This requires missile defenses

that protect allies and the U.S. homeland from attack. Failing to

deploy defenses that keep pace with the growing threat, whether

as a means to encourage Russian participation in offensive arms

reductions or as a way to reduce the budget, will only undermine

deterrence and increase the risk of destruction to the United

States.

Similarly, we must continue to deploy a credible nuclear force

that can meet the spectrum of deterrence requirements and provide

solid assurance to allies. Going to lower and lower levels of forces

in pursuit of a nuclear-free world is likely only to embolden our

adversaries and shake the confidence of our friends and allies. And

if our allies doubt our capacity or will to meet their security commitments,

the outcome will be the reverse of the goal sought by

global zero proponents: more rather than fewer nuclear weapons.

Six and finally, the last lesson is that the United States must

lead. At times we have failed to show the required leadership,

avoiding confrontation with the DPRK on a number of its most

harmful activities, including its missile and nuclear proliferation.

This absence of leadership affects not only the calculations in

Pyongyang but also of Tehran where another oppressive regime is

seeking missile and nuclear capabilities to undermine U.S. interests

in a region of vital interest.

Iran does watch closely United States policy and United States

resolve to reverse what three Presidents, President Clinton, President

Bush, and now President Obama, have declared to be unacceptable:

a nuclear-armed North Korea. What they have seen so far

has certainly not dissuaded them.

Thank you again for the invitation of being here today. I look forward

to your questions.

Senator, I think that is a very important

question. There is only one time in my experience in which I

observed the Chinese on the cusp of making a strategic decision to

change its relationship with North Korea, and that was in October

2006 after the first test. The first nuclear test was a profound

shock. It was a profound shock in the region and it was internationally,

given the risk to the nonproliferation regime itself.

Within a couple days of that test, Condi Rice was asked to go the

region and asked me to go with her. We stopped in Japan. And in

Japan, the focus of Prime Minister Abe, Foreign Minister Aso, was

on the reassurance of the Japanese public that the United States

would stand by its security commitments and explicitly restate its

nuclear guarantee to Japan.

What is interesting is when we got to Beijing, the first thing the

Chinese did was thank us for reaffirming our security and our

nuclear guarantees to Japan. What China was concerned about

was the nuclear dynamic. It was the dynamic of the possibility of

Japan and maybe South Korea going nuclear in that context. That

was the only time that there seemed to be a prospect, a window

of opportunity for getting China to change its policy. This is the

first time that China went along with the U.N. Security Council

resolution which had real sanctions, 1718. China offered to work

with us to implement those sanctions, including denying the luxury

goods for the elites of North Korea.

But it was not too long after that that China went right back to

its comfort zone and did not challenge the North Korean provocations.

And it did that in the context of the United States and

others releasing pressure on North Korea. Instead of increasing

pressure, we released pressure. And we did that because of the

false prospect of negotiations, the false promise that North Korea

would come back to the negotiating table. And it did. And it did

only to start, once again, the cycle of no negotiations, provocations,

concessions, and failure to live up to its obligations.

I do not know what it is going to take to get China to change

its assessment. China has many reasons for supporting North

Korea. I mean, it is concerned about what happens with unification.

It is concerned about refugees coming over the border.

It is going to take a real concerted effort, and quite frankly, it

is going to take pressure on the part of the United States on China

to change. More dialogue about the six-party talks is not going to

do it. We are going to have to decide whether this is important

enough to us that we actually put some pressure on China to

change its policy.

But even if China changes its policy, I think that will be a very

important step toward getting North Korea to alter course, but that

is not enough either. We need a comprehensive strategy to deal

with this.

Senator, taking your second question first,

I think there is a chance that if we fail with North Korea and if

we do not demonstrate through both our declaratory policy and our

capacity in both the nuclear area, as well as in the missile defense

area, there is a likelihood that Japan will overcome its long-term

allergy about nuclear weapons and begin to hedge. South Korea

also very much a concern about proliferation in the future if we

fail—if we fail—with North Korea.

In terms of what cards we have to play with China, there are not

any easy ones. If there were easy ones, I think we would have

played them by now. This has been going on for 20 years. I think

we have to make the assessment whether or not this issue—the

issue of North Korea and China’s continuing support, continuing

lifeline of assistance to North Korea—is sufficiently important to us

that we begin to put economic pressure on China, that we begin to

call out China for its part in sustaining what is the most abhorrent

regime I think in the world today. There are a number of things

that we can do, but up until today, we have been more interested

in China’s role as a facilitator in the six-party talks. That does not

get us to where we need to be with China.

Senator, I come at this from a nonproliferation

perspective and that is my expertise, if I have expertise. And

clearly, North Korea has, for decades, been the No. 1 proliferator.

It is a serial proliferator. We know it from its missile sales and the

transfer of missile technology to a number of countries. We know

it from the Syria experience in providing a plutonium reactor to

Syria. North Korea will sell what it has.

I am very concerned not only about state proliferation relationships

but also, as Ambassador DeTrani just mentioned, the nonstate

and access through North Korea to fissile material and weapons.

And it is, as someone said, a very hard intelligence problem,

and we have been subject to a number of strategic surprises in this

area. So despite knowing how hard the intelligence community

works on this problem, I also share the sense that there is a lot

we simply do not know and we need to be prepared for the worst

based on North Korea’s experience.

Well, just to add to my colleague’s comments

with which I certainly agree, sanctions will only work—and

I think they have limited impact—but they will only work in the

context of a broader strategy. It is not a question of sanctions or

our strategy or diplomacy as our strategy. We have got to put these

various instruments together, and that has been lacking.

And what also has been lacking is a sustained effort. When we

have made a difference, when we have created pain—and I think

the Banco Delta Asia experience is very apt here. When we have

put pressure on the North, we have allowed that pressure to be released.

We have done that through this false and fanciful promise

of negotiations. Negotiations will only work if we apply pressure,

and that is one thing we learned from the Libyan experience. It

was not you get into negotiations, you release the pressure. I mean,

this is negotiating 101. And yet, time after time, Republican and

Democratic administrations, we have made the same fundamental

mistake with North Korea. A lot of it is because we hope. We hope

North Korea will change, and we ignore our experience for the sake

of hope.